Vote
[NGV-05] DUST Claim Reform: Commitment-Based Release
Summary
This Governance Vote proposes commitment-based release for DUST lending rewards without changing the gross reward distribution schedule.
Users will retain the option to claim 50% immediately as liquid DUST, while timed veDUST claims will receive progressively more DUST as the selected commitment approaches the maximum duration. A 28-day commitment will receive 60% of the gross claim, a maximum-duration and infinite lock commitments will receive 100%, and intermediate commitments will scale linearly between them.
Breaking a commitment before maturity will incur an additional early-exit penalty that ranges from 75% to a minimum of 25%. The penalty becomes 0% only when the commitment is completed. All claim-time and early-exit penalties will be burned permanently onchain the same way they do today.
The objective is to continue distributing DUST while reducing structural liquid supply growth, discouraging farm-and-dump behavior, and ensuring that full release follows completed commitment.
Background
RFC-07 originally illustrated the proposed commitment-based release curve using a small set of duration examples. Those figures were reference points on a proportional curve, chosen for illustration. The next section summarizes how veDUST locks and their voting power behave in the deployed contracts; this Background then sets out the problem the RFC addresses and the model adopted to resolve it.
- Lock duration: A lock’s unlock date is rounded down to the preceding fixed weekly boundary (Thursday 00:00 UTC, the veDUST week grid). A timed lock must resolve to at least 4 weeks (28 days) and at most 52 weeks (364 days). Because the rounding applies to the end date, the realized length equals the requested duration reduced by however far the requested end time sits past the previous boundary, up to one week, so the same request can settle at slightly different whole-week lengths depending on when it is opened. A request that rounds below the 28-day minimum is rejected, and one that would exceed the cap settles at the 52-week maximum. For example, a 30-day request settles at 28, 29, or 30 days depending on the day it is created, and is rejected on the days where rounding would fall below 28 days.
- Timed and infinite locks: A timed lock has a fixed unlock date on the weekly grid, and its voting power decays as that date approaches. An infinite lock has no unlock date and holds constant voting power until the holder unlocks it back into a maximum-length timed lock.
- Claiming rewards: DUST rewards can be received as a new timed lock, as a infinite lock, or claimed liquid immediately. The instant liquid claim carries a fixed 50% penalty routed to the revenue/burn wallet of Neverland. Claiming into a lock currently carries no claim-time penalty. Aligning these two paths is the subject of this RFC.
- Early exit: A timed lock can be withdrawn before maturity for a penalty routed to the revenue/burn wallet of Neverland. Today that penalty scales with the fraction of the commitment still remaining, so it is largest just after locking and falls to zero at maturity. This is the third path addressed on this proposal.
Community feedback favored preserving the existing flywheel and its flexible timed locks and the 50% instant claim. The discussion then focused on aligning the claim-time penalty with the early-exit penalty without creating durations that could be gamed.
Several intermediate models produced “magic durations” where a user could select a longer commitment, receive more voting power and revenue participation, exit early, and still receive more DUST than a user who selected the equivalent shorter commitment and completed it.
The final model promoted through the RFC discussion resolves this by:
- Starting the claim-time penalty at 40% for a 28-day commitment and decreasing it linearly to 0% at the maximum duration.
- Preserving the existing 50% instant-claim option.
- Starting the early-exit penalty at 75% and decreasing it toward a minimum of 25% before maturity, rather than allowing it to decay to 0%.
- Withdrawals from a fully decayed lock receive all DUST in the lock without a penalty.
The model was tested across every whole-day commitment from 28 to 364 days and every possible whole-day early exit, covering 66,052 cases. It produced zero violations of the required economic invariant.
Request for comments:
RFC-07: DUST Claim Reform, Commitment-Based Release
Proposal
1. Scope
All DUST lending rewards claimed after activation will be subject to the new release rules, including rewards accrued before activation but claimed afterward.
The gross DUST reward distribution schedule and emission rates will remain unchanged. The reform changes only the release of rewards when they are claimed.
All DUST charged through a claim-time or early-exit penalty will be burned permanently onchain, the same way they do today.
2. Instant claim
The existing instant-claim option will remain available:
- The user receives 50% of the gross claim as liquid DUST.
- The remaining 50% is burned permanently.
3. Timed veDUST claims
For a timed commitment between MINTIME and MAXTIME:
MINTIMEis 28 days.MAXTIMEis 365 days.- The claim-time penalty is 40% at
MINTIME. - The claim-time penalty decreases linearly to 0% at
MAXTIME.
- claim penalty rate = 40% * (MAXTIME - commitment) / (MAXTIME - MINTIME)
- locked amount = gross rewards * (1 - claim penalty rate)
This produces the following approximate outcomes:
| Claim option | DUST received | DUST burned at claim |
|---|---|---|
| Instant claim | 50% liquid | 50% |
| 4-week lock (28 days) | 60% locked | 40% |
| 13-week lock (91 days) | 67.5% locked | 32.5% |
| 26-week lock (182 days) | 78.3% locked | 21.7% |
| 39-week lock (273 days) | 89.2% locked | 10.8% |
| 52-week lock (364 days) | 99.88% locked | 0.12% |
| Infinite lock (max time) | 100% locked | 0% |
Exact values will be calculated using the commitment duration in seconds. The week-based rows above represent approximate quarter-year intervals.
The net amount remaining after the claim-time penalty will be deposited into a new or existing veDUST position. When rewards are added to an existing timed position, the calculation will use its actual remaining duration. An existing position with less than MINTIME remaining must be extended above MINTIME or will not be eligible for a timed reward addition.
Rewards claimed into an infinite veDUST position will receive no claim-time penalty.
The claim-time penalty applies only to rewards distributed through the incentives claim path. DUST already held in a user’s wallet may continue to be locked without a claim-time penalty.
4. Early exit
An active timed lock may still be exited before maturity. The early-exit penalty will depend only on the lock’s remaining duration.
For an active lock with remaining duration R:
- early-exit penalty rate = 25% + (50% * R / MAXTIME)
- amount received = locked amount * (1 - early-exit penalty rate)
The following rules apply:
- The early-exit penalty is capped at 75%.
- The penalty decreases linearly toward 25% as the remaining duration approaches 0.
- The penalty never falls below 25% while the lock remains active.
- The penalty becomes 0% only once the lock reaches maturity.
- An infinite lock carries a 75% early-exit penalty, the user may change it to time-lock to decay.
- The penalty applies to the amount remaining after any claim-time penalty.
- The early-exit penalty is burned permanently.
Example: A claim of 1,000 DUST into a 28-day lock burns 400 DUST and places 600 DUST into veDUST. An immediate exit applies an early-exit penalty of approximately 28.84% to the locked amount, leaving approximately 427 DUST. This remains less than the 500 DUST available through an instant claim.
The revised early-exit formula will apply to early exits executed after activation. Existing locked balances, maturity dates, and veDUST power calculations will not otherwise change.
5. Required economic invariant
For every elapsed duration X, a user who selected a commitment longer than X and exits after X must receive less gross DUST than a user who selected a commitment of exactly X and completed it.
For elapsed durations below the 28-day minimum, the comparison is the instant-claim option, which returns 50% of gross rewards.
This invariant must hold across lock creation, reward additions, extensions, merges, splits, transfers, infinite-lock conversions, and early exits. An operation that strengthens or modifies a commitment must not create a cheaper exit path.
6. Unchanged mechanics
This proposal does not change:
- Gross DUST reward emissions or their distribution schedule.
- The way rewards accrue to suppliers and borrowers.
- veDUST voting-power or revenue-sharing calculations.
- The linear decay of timed veDUST power.
- The non-decaying power of infinite veDUST positions.
- Existing veDUST balances or maturity dates.
- The ability to lock DUST already held in a wallet without a penalty.
- veDUST marketplace mechanics or royalties.
Risk Considerations
Economic transition
The reform is expected to reduce short-term farming returns and may cause borrowing demand driven primarily by DUST extraction to unwind. Protocol TVL, utilization, and revenue may fall during the transition before organic demand and new revenue sources develop.
The reform will also reduce the rate at which rewards become liquid. Although this is intended to reduce structural selling pressure, it may reduce available trading float over time if liquid demand does not develop.
Early-exit discontinuity
The penalty remains at least 25% until maturity and becomes 0% only when the commitment is completed. This discontinuity is intentional: exiting early and completing the commitment are economically different actions. The interface must make the exact cost clear before an early exit is confirmed.
Existing positions
Existing balances, maturity dates, and veDUST power will not change. However, a holder who voluntarily exits an active position after activation will be subject to the revised early-exit formula.
Implementation and security
The 66,052-case model validates the economic invariant across whole-day commitment and exit combinations. It does not replace contract-level testing across seconds, rounding boundaries, position mutations, authorization paths, or state transitions.
Incorrect rounding, timestamp handling, additions, extensions, merges, splits, or infinite-lock conversions could create an unintended cheaper exit path. The implementation therefore requires extensive unit, fuzz, invariant, and integration testing before activation.
Governance Approval
By approving this Governance Vote, governance authorizes the Neverland team to:
- Implement the 40%-to-0% claim-time penalty defined in this proposal.
- Preserve the 50% instant-claim option.
- Implement the 75%-to-25% early-exit penalty defined in this proposal, with no penalty at maturity.
- Apply both penalties through the DUST incentives and veDUST systems as specified.
- Burn all DUST collected through these penalties.
- Update the claim and early-exit interfaces to display the resulting amounts and require explicit user confirmation.
- Activate the reform only after completing the required implementation, testing, and security review.
Approval does not authorize changes to gross DUST emissions, veDUST voting-power calculations, revenue-sharing calculations, existing balances, existing maturity dates, or marketplace mechanics.
Any material deviation from the approved formulas, parameters, invariant, or execution scope requires further governance review.
Voting Options
- Approve the Claim Reform
- Reject and retain the current
- Abstain
Execution Considerations
Following approval, execution is expected to proceed in the following order:
- Finalize the contract-level specification and encode the approved economic invariant as executable tests.
- Implement the required changes across the incentives claim path, veDUST early-exit logic, supporting view functions, and user interface.
- Test the implementation across exact-second boundaries, rounding behavior, claim additions, extensions, merges, splits, transfers, infinite locks, conversions, maturity, and early exits.
- Conduct excessive security review.
- Schedule the upgrade of the contract implementations via the Governance 24H Timelock.
- Execute and activate the new rules after the timelock window expires.
No user migration or action is required before activation. Existing positions will retain their balances and maturity dates. All reward claims and voluntary early exits executed after activation will follow the approved rules.
If testing or review identifies a violation of the approved invariant, activation must be delayed until the issue is resolved. The Neverland team may delay execution for security reasons.
Closing Statement
This Governance Vote asks veDUST holders to approve a transition from short-term liquid reward extraction toward commitment-based release while preserving the existing DUST distribution schedule and flexible veDUST system.
The tradeoff is direct: short-term farming activity, TVL, and protocol revenue may decline. In return, rewards will enter liquid circulation according to completed commitment, broken commitments will carry a meaningful cost, and the protocol will stop manufacturing the same price-insensitive sell flow through every reward epoch.
Governance participants should evaluate whether this transition and its expected short-term costs are justified by the objective of building a more sustainable DUST economy.